What Are the Odds that the US Can Successfully Run Venezuela?

History is not kind to the idea. Nonetheless, let’s investigate a current take.

Who’s In Charge Now?

The answer may seem clear, but it’s not. OK, Trump installed Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, not Maria Corina Machado, who was the legitimate winner of the last election.

That should tell you something in and of itself.

Allegedly, this is because Machado accepted the Nobel Peace Prize which Trump thought he deserved.

To what extent will Rodríguez do exactly what Trump wants?

Trump says she has no choice. However, that’s not accurate. The military has a say, and neither she nor Trump controls the Venezuelan military.

Realistic Assessment by Sizwe SikaMusi

A Nightmare Has Begun

Donald Trump announced that his Secretary of War will “run” Venezuela until the United States can carry out what he calls a “safe, proper and judicious transition.” This is not happening.

As of right now, Venezuela’s militias, specifically the Bolivarian Militia and the urban paramilitary networks known as colectivos, have not backed down. Far from allowing America’s Secretary of War and a US-appointed “group” to run the country, they have become the primary agents of what is rapidly evolving into a chaotic and dangerous resistance.

Since the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Caracas has effectively become a ghost town. Citizens are skipping work, businesses are shuttered, and people are staying indoors because of the colectivos.

The leftist paramilitaries are now the most visible armed presence in the capital. While Delta Force and US air assets achieved overwhelming tactical dominance during the brief raid that removed Maduro, they have not established persistent control over residential neighbourhoods.

That vacuum has been filled locally, block by block. The colectivos have also reframed the conflict. What might once have been portrayed as a struggle to defend Maduro has now been recast as a “decolonial war” against US occupation.

This narrative shift matters. It transforms the struggle from regime defence into national resistance, and it makes the colectivos the main obstacle to the “security” Washington claims it intends to provide.

Despite US assertions that Venezuela’s military was “incapacitated,” Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López appeared on national television alongside Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to declare that the armed forces and militias remain loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution.

Whether or not this reflects unified command is beside the point; it signals continuity, defiance, and an intent to resist. America’s Secretary of War has insisted that “President Trump sets the terms.” In practice, those terms are already being rewritten by asymmetric warfare. This is not a promising start.

According to the Robert Lansing Institute, if the United States limits itself to air power and special operations while leaving Venezuelans to manage the transition, insurgency is likely to emerge not as classic guerrilla warfare against US troops, but as urban unrest, terrorism, and targeted attacks on perceived collaborators.

Conversely, Lansing warns that a large and prolonged US troop presence would almost certainly catalyse a broader, more organised armed resistance.

Either path is bleak. Trump has initiated a process he cannot easily reverse, and there is no clean off-ramp for him or his war secretary. Over the next six to twelve months, the most probable pattern is episodic violence: bombings, armed clashes in pro-Chavista strongholds, targeted assassinations, and cartel-linked criminal activity exploiting the breakdown in authority.

The so-called “Iraq model” becomes increasingly likely the longer the US maintains a visible, large-scale military presence on Venezuelan soil. If Washington truly intends to “run” Venezuela until a transition can be engineered, it will require, and likely lose, a significant number of soldiers.

The contradiction is clearest around oil. While US officials talk openly about rebuilding Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, militias and loyalist military units are expected to target those facilities to prevent the foreign plunder.

This dynamic is already visible in the Orinoco Belt, which accounts for roughly two-thirds of Venezuela’s oil production. The United States may control ports and terminals, but militias control pipelines and territory. Production is in freefall.

Trump has promised to sell “large amounts of oil.” For now, that promise is being blocked by asymmetric warfare, the very phenomenon US officials publicly acknowledge while underestimating its consequences.

In short, the United States may “run” oil terminals and fortified government buildings, but Venezuela’s militias run the streets and much of the rural heartland.

What Trump and his handlers face a law-enforcement nightmare in which every urban block risks becoming a bloody battle zone. And by every available indicator, that nightmare has already begun.

Iraq Flashback

Think back to George H. Bush in Iraq. Bush had an international consensus to take action.

Yet, out of fear of creating a power vacuum, he wisely stopped short of taking out Saddam Hussein.

Unlike his father, George W. Bush did not have a global consensus to go into Iraq. And unlike his father , he did take out Hussein.

The result was a power vacuum that created ISIS.

The Easy Part

This is a different setup, but comparisons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam are unavoidable.

It was easy to take out Hussein. And it was easy to take out Maduro.

Much of Venezuela may be cheering. However, the military isn’t. And Trump’s alleged puppet seems defiant, at least at times.

Understanding the Vacuum

We don’t know Rodríguez’s intentions yet. She might not even know because it is not her decision alone.

Perhaps she tries to cooperate. But even if she tries to cooperate, the military and the colectivos have a say.

Here’s a key paragraph from above.

That vacuum has been filled locally, block by block. The colectivos have also reframed the conflict. What might once have been portrayed as a struggle to defend Maduro has now been recast as a “decolonial war” against US occupation.

Repression on the Ground Already

Bloomberg reports Venezuela Regroups With New Leader, Old Repression Tactics

Heavily armed security forces and pro-government motorcycle gangs known as colectivos were seen roaming the capital, at times stopping drivers and checking their phones. While they aren’t as influential as they were at the height of Maduro’s power, the State Department has said they have been responsible for killings during protests.

“The presence of colectivos on the streets is clearly intended to reinforce the government’s internal repression scheme and prevent popular mobilizations through fear,” said Andrei Serbin Pont, president of the Buenos Aires-based research group CRIES, who closely monitors Venezuela’s security forces. There are also military checkpoints, through which “the government is trying to obstruct drone reconnaissance activities that it believes the US is conducting.”

What’s happening on the ground in Caracas doesn’t quite match the calls for peace Rodríguez made during her swearing-in ceremony on Monday.

Bloomberg Key Points

• Venezuela’s government is reasserting itself after the capture of Nicolás Maduro, swearing in Delcy Rodríguez as acting president and flashing warning signs that a new wave of repression has begun.
• Heavily armed security forces and pro-government motorcycle gangs known as colectivos are roaming the capital, detaining journalists and stopping drivers to check their phones.
• Delcy Rodríguez has the backing of both the Chavismo strongholds in her government and US President Donald Trump, and has called for peace and social welfare, but her words do not match the repression on the ground in Caracas.

Four Key Unanswered Questions

1. How many US troops will it take to control Venezuela, block by block?
2. At what cost?
3. How long will it take?
4. How many US Lives lost?

Was It the Oil?

Some of my readers said this was not about oil.

OK, play this.

Note: I am not at all a Jon Stewart fan. Much of this is overdone and dramatized to the point it’s not even funny.

But it’s worth a play to the end for the points made and the hypocrisy of Trump.

Likeness to a Mafia Family

Running Venezuela is a group decision. This is not a democracy, it’s a Mafia family. The group leaders — the heads of the crime family — have to consider the US ability to kill them individually by drones or commandos.

The US knows who they are — our CIA is all over Caracas — and where they go.

Importantly, Trump does not want a democratically elected government, he wants a mafia boss he can control, one who heads up the oil business.

Understanding the true goal increases the likelihood of success, by coercion, graft, payoffs, and mafia tactics. Nonetheless, the costs and the difficulties must not be understated.

I am open to other well-presented ideas, but not mindless cheerleading.

If you have a different position, then tell us how many boots on the ground it will take and what it will cost.

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